RECENT CASES
881 (1923). But where the money obtained by the wife is in the nature of a property settlement or division and she alone is interested, whether payment is to be
made at one time or in instalments as in the instant case, or where instalments of support or maintenance money have become due, the courts do not concern themselves
with the future support of the wife and so find no objection to assignment. Madurcan
v. Madurcan,77 L.T.R. 474 (1897); LYnkan v. Huefty, 44 App. D.C. 589 (I916); Bassett
v. Waters, IO3 Kan. 853, 176 Pac. 663 (I918); Procterv. Curchin, 273 N.Y.S. 821 (1934);
Meissner v. Bergman, Ii Ohio C. C. 539 (1896).

Personal Property-Safety Deposit Boxes-Garnishment-Relation between Customer and Bank-[Minnesota].-A Minnesota statute provided that a garnishee must
disclose the property of the defendant in his possession or control. 2 Mason's Minn.
Stat. §§ 9358, 9360 (1927). The defendant rented a safety deposit box from garnishee
bank under a contract stipulating that the parties did not contemplate a bailment.
The box could be opened only by the simultaneous use of two keys, one in possession
of the garnishee, the other in possession of the rentor. Held, the contents were not in
the possession or control of the garnishee. Wells v. Cole, 260 N.W. 520 (Minn. 1935).
The relationship between the safety deposit company and the customer has
been subsumed under three conventional categories: (1) Bailment. Mayer v. Brensinger, 18o Ill. 110, 54 N.E. I59 (1899); Morgan v. Citizen's Bank, 19o N.C. 209, 129
S.E. 585 (1925); West Cache Sugar Co. v. Hendrickson, 56 Utah 327, I9o Pac. 946
(1920). Courts have frequently accepted this view and permitted garnishment of the
contents. State ex rel. Rabiste v. Southern, 300 Mo. 417, 254 S.W. 166 (1923); Tillinghast v. Johnson, 34 R.I. 136, 82 Atl. 788 (1912). This classification appears to be erroneous because a transfer of possession is necessary for bailment and the safety deposit box transaction, for reasons given below, does not involve a transfer of possession.
(2) Landlord and tenant. DuPont v. Moore, 86 N.H. 259, 166 At. 417 (1933); People
ex rel. Glynn v. Mercantile Safe Deposit Co., 159 App. Div. 98, 143 N.Y.S. 849 (1913)
(where box could be opened without cooperation of the bank). The relationship of the
parties seems equally inconsistent with this concept. The parties do not contemplate a
transfer of an interest in land and possession of the leased premises is not transferred
for the term of the lease. See Morgan v. Citizen's Bank, Igo N.C. 209, 212, 129 S.E.
585, 587 (1925). The tenancy and bailment views, it might be noted, are neither inconsistent nor mutually exclusive. A conceivable theory is that there was a lease of the
space in which the contents were to be placed plus a bailment of the contents. But the
difficulty of finding the transfer of possession necessary for bailment is as great in this
situation as in that where only bailment is contemplated. (3) Licensor and licensee.
This classification has been no more than suggested. See National Bank v. Stead, 232
U.S. 58, 68 (1913); II Minn. L. Rev. 440, 445 (1927).
Although courts have deemed it essential to force the safety deposit relationship
into one of the conventional categories, the real problem raised by the garnishment
cases is one of statutory construction which generally involves a determination of
whether or not the bank is in possession of the contents of the safety deposit box.
While there is no universally accepted definition of de facto possession, three elements are common to all definitions: (i) an intent to exclude others from the res;
(2) a power to deal with the res; and (3) a power to exclude others from so dealing

THE UNIVERSITY OF CHICAGO LAW REVIEW
therewith. Pollock and Wright, Possession in the Common Law 13 (i88i); Holmes,
The Common Law 216 and 220 (i88i). In the safety deposit cases, the fact that each
party retains one of two keys, both of which must be used jointly to open the box,
manifests both a common intent and power to exclude third parties. On the other
hand, neither party has power to deal affirmatively with the contents.of the box without the cooperation of the other. Thus, there is no transfer of possession to the bank,
although the bank's proximity to the contents and its control of the means of access
afford it a better opportunity to acquire, by force, the power to use the contents. As
between the bank and its customer, all that can be said is that neither fulfils the three
requirements for possession. In the relation of these two to third persons, no more can
be said than that possession is held by them jointly.
The conclusion in the instant case, that there was no transfer of possession to the
bank, is not only consistent with the foregoing analysis of possession, but is probably
the result of a sound exercise of statutory construction. In requiring that the subject
matter must be "in possession or under the control" of the garnishee, the Minnesota
legislature probably intended to make available to garnishment process only property
to which the garnishee had liberty of access and with which he could deal independently and without the defendant-debtor's cooperation. The court suggests that the legislature did not intend to allow garnishment in cases where the property in question
could be reached by other means. Presumably, the court had reference to the statutory
provisions in Minnesota for execution by judgment creditors and for attachment of a
debtor's property. 2 Mason's Minn. Stat. §§ 9419, 9342 (1927).

Suretyship-Estoppel in Pals-The Main Purpose Doctrine-Bases of Liability for
Oral Promlse-[Federal].-The defendant corporation contracted to buy a grain company that owed the plaintiffs $8o,ooo. The defendant's president stated orally to the
plaintiffs that his corporation had taken over the grain company and would see that
the debt was paid, if they would continue business relations and not press the account.
The plaintiffs accordingly continued dealings with the grain company. Thereafter the
corporation rescinded its contract to purchase without notice to the plaintiffs, the
grain company went into bankruptcy, and the plaintiffs then sued the defendant corporation to recover the amount of the indebtedness. Held: that the defendant could
not plead § 59(i) of the Statute of Frauds (the requirement of a written promise to
answer for the debt of another), because (i) the defendant made the promise primarily
for its own benefit and (2) was estopped by the plaintiffs' detrimehtal reliance upon its
statements. Wright v. Farmers'National Corp., 74 F. (2d) 425 (C.C.A. 7th 1934).
While admitting the application of the Statute of Frauds to secondary or collateral
promises, the courts have nevertheless been able to find several grounds for holding
oral promises in certain situations not subject to its requirement of a written memorandum. See Alphin v. Lowman, 115 Va. 44I, 79 S.E. 1029 (1913) (promise interpreted as
one of indemnity); Gibbs v. Blanchard, iS Mich. 292 (1867) and Bryant v. Panter, 9i
Ore. 686, 178 Pac. 989 (i919) (promisor treated as a co-debtor); Tannhauser v. Shea,
88 Mont. 562, 295 Pac. 268 (1930); 39 Harv. L. Rev. 401 (1926) (promise amounting
to a novation). And so oral promises found to be primary or original undertakings
have been enforced. Emrson v. Slater, 63 U.S. 28 (1859); Grant v. Kinney, 117 Ohio
St. 362, 159 N.E. 346 (1927); i Williston, Contracts § 463 (1920). The court in the
principal case utilized the main purpose doctrine to enforce an oral promise. The

